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Abstract
In this article we look at the Polish media discourse on privacy. In the analysis, we draw on theoretical approaches that
understand privacy as having four dimensions: relational, participatory, contextual, and technological. Moreover, we seek
whether a specific norm of data-related privacy could be defined/redefined within the discourse. Considering the post-
communist past that shapes a specific approach to surveillance and the general polarisation of polish media discourse,
one would expect the key role of privacy issues in the public sphere. Thus, applying a critical discourse studies analysis, the
aim was to capture the character of the so far under-researched privacy in Polish media discourse. We study what types of
institutional agents are mentioned as creating privacy policies and what dimensions of privacy they tackle. Moreover, we
also try to capture whether the institutional position offers a specific normative understanding of privacy and whether this
norm is citizen/user-oriented. The results of the study indicate that: both the media discourse and the normative content
of privacy policies are dominated by legal aspects concerned with the issues resulting from EU regulations (i.e., General
Data Protection Regulation); privacy policies are institutionally dispersed and monopolised by journalists and experts in-
stead of state officials or politicians; and there is only limited evidence of a discursive frame of a citizen-oriented norm of
how to protect data-related privacy.
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1. Introduction
The implementation of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in mid-2018 triggered a Polish me-
dia discourse on privacy and animated the first Polish
discussion on data protection. The Polish case can be
considered as intriguing given its unique historical and
contemporary political contexts. Post-communist coun-
tries have a sole approach to some privacy issues,
for example surveillance. They are also more likely to
show general anxiety, which corresponds to increased
surveillance concerns (Svenonius & Björklund, 2018).
Given this, it might be expected that the issue of pri-
vacy would be a particularly salient one Poland, but
it was mainly neglected for the last three decades.
At the same time, Polish society faces the develop-
ment of privacy-invasive institutional practices and their
consequences for the public. Contemporary political
changes in Poland after the electoral victory of conser-
vative and anti-European parties lead to introduction
of new surveillance (i.e., the Pegasus surveillance sys-
tem). Moreover, development of political microtargeting
based on users’ data resulted in advanced usage of disin-
formation tools in political campaigns in Poland (Gorwa,
2017). Although the development of privacy-invasive pol-
itics and technologies in Poland was tackled in terms of
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surveillance (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2016;
Sojka, 2013; Szumańska, Klicki, Niklas, Szymielewicz, &
Walkowiak, 2016) or online security (Centrum Badania
Opinii Społecznej, 2018) there is limited, up-to-date, and
rigorous research output that captures these issues.
On the academic level, there is no comprehensive
research on the nature of Polish media discourses on
privacy. Only partially, privacy and surveillance were
analysed by Möller and Nowak (2018b) in terms of
privacy-oriented media practices of civil society agents,
by Ptaszek (2018) who studied attitudes and knowledge
on surveillance and privacy among adolescents, or by
Svenonius and Björklund (2018) who comparatively ex-
plored the attitudes to surveillance in post-communist
societies. However, privacy-related issues are under-
researched when it comes to discourse studies. To fill this
gap, this article aims to analyse the character of contem-
porary privacy media discourse in Poland.We study what
privacy dimensions are tackled by particular types of in-
stitutional agents promoting privacy policies in the me-
dia discourse. Moreover, we try to capture whether the
discourse reflects a specific normative understanding of
privacy and whether this norm is citizen/user-oriented.
By that, we expect to see whether a specific privacy di-
mensions and agents framed in the discourse enhance
normatively citizens and users or, on the contrary, rein-
forces inequality and imbalance where state actors and
tech companies build the privacy-invasive norm. To do
so, we have designed a research framework that follows
Nissenbaum’s (2010) idea of contextual integrity that un-
derstands privacy as being contextual and having a nor-
mative element. Based on this, we attempt to ascertain
whether norms of data-related privacy can be (re)defined
in the discourse. Moreover, we implement Möller and
Nowak (2018a, 2018b) take in which theoretical ap-
proaches to privacy are considered as four dimensional:
Contextual, relational, participatory, and technological.
2. Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical approach uses the discursive analysis to
track the character of Polish media discourse on privacy.
We understand discourse as a form of communicative so-
cial practice. In other words, “texts, as forms of interac-
tion, are seen as discursive practices, and these discur-
sive practices are also social practices” (Bennett, 2018).
It means that the discourse reaches above the level of
language. It is rather a “a two-way relationship between
a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institu-
tion(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: the discur-
sive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them”
(Unger, Wodak, & KhosraviNik, 2016, p. 907). In the con-
text of this article, this means that the social institutions
‘think’ and ‘act’ according to how they ‘speak’ about it.
Hence, tracking the privacy dimensions in the media dis-
course allows for analysis of the understandings of pri-
vacy in relation to institutional actors putting them for-
ward available in the Polish public debate.
In general, the Polish political discourse can be cap-
tured with three most distinctive features. The first
one is polarisation, where the discourse re-creates
political divisions and frames the oppositional camps
(Balczyńska-Kosman, 2013) and ideological conflicts
(Czyżewski, Kowalski, & Piotrowski, 2010). The second
concerns negativity and emotionality, where institu-
tional actors frame particular political issues in terms of
negative labelling of the opponents (Balczyńska-Kosman,
2013). The third is the media-orientation, where media
shape the political discourse due to specific priming and
framing (Balczyńska-Kosman, 2013). Thus, the question
rises if the discourse on privacy also follows such char-
acteristic? Especially when we compare it to Germany
where the issues of privacy are addressed in terms of
criticizing the current level of privacy and the need of en-
hancing it (cf. von Pape, Trepte, & Mothes, 2017) or nor-
malization of surveillance technology (Meissner & von
Nordheim, 2018).
As a starting point in seeking traces of privacy in the
discourse, we apply the Nissenbaum’s idea of contextual
integrity (2010) and multi-dimensional composition of
privacy proposed by Möller and Nowak (2018a). Thus,
we use the approach where privacy is characterised by
five dimensions: Contextual, normative, relational, par-
ticipatory, and technological.
Firstly, privacy is contextual and as such must be sit-
uated and researched in specific contexts. Nissenbaum
introduces the notion of contextual integrity that:
Provides a rigorous, substantive account of factors de-
termining when people will perceive new information
technologies and systems as threats to privacy; it not
only predicts how people will react to such systems
but also formulates an approach to evaluating these
systems and prescribing legitimate responses to them.
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 2)
Thus, privacy depends on and constitutes social norms,
resources, rules, and cultural arrangements that may
substantially differ from one society to another. For ex-
ample, when considering technology as a threat to pri-
vacy, this is contextual and has to be perceived whilst
taking multiple variables into account (including cul-
tural, historical, and even geographical). Yet, according to
Nissenbaum (2010, p. 11), the framework of contextual
integrity fits “to model peoples’ reactions to troubling
technology-based systems and practices as well as to for-
mulate normative guidelines for policy, action, and de-
sign.” Thus, concerning Polish historical and contempo-
rary privacy-invasive politics, the way in which discourse
on privacy is framed may shed more light on how the
particular contexts effect or model the privacy policy ad-
dressed by institutions.
Secondly, privacy is normative. Thus, a normative ap-
proach to privacy attempts to capture whether a specific
norm of data-related privacy is present within the me-
dia discourse. Drilling down, a more specific question is
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whether this norm is citizen-oriented or not. BothMöller
and Nowak’s (2018a), and Nissenbaum’s (2010) frame-
works are practice-oriented and dwell on the idea that
users are able to respond to the surveillance using me-
dia technologies. Or, to fine tune it slightly, how peo-
ple should take care of their privacy and data protection
while they use communication technologies. This is espe-
cially germane to the Polishmedia discourse case, where
data protection and privacy are relatively new phenom-
ena. Indeed, the GDPR’s introduction launched the first
major national discussion on privacy, not only by pre-
scribing some legal norms but also by exposing the cat-
egory of ‘privacy’ in the discourse, making it visible and
discussed in society.
Möller and Nowak (2018a), who draw on
Nissenbaum’s approach, aside from contextual privacy,
list three other dimensions: relational, participatory, and
technological. Thus, thirdly, relational privacy concerns
the relationship between people, the information they
produce and the third parties that manage the informa-
tion. Understood in such a way, privacy depends on the
place of the individual (or institution) in relation to the
level of privacy and openness one wants to preserve
within communication processes in society (cf. Westin,
2015). Concerning the media discourse, this dimension
allows observing how the discourse manifests the rela-
tions between society shaped by post-communist expe-
riences and the state that conducts a privacy-invasive
politics. The relational dimension regarding privacy in
the Polish discourse is also important since Poles believe
that data sharing is non-alternative and data protection
is becoming a very important issue for citizens (European
Commission, 2015). Thus, regarding the state’s politics,
one would expect the media discourse to refrain citizen-
oriented relation in order to protect people’s privacy.
Fourthly, privacy is participatory, which means that
the actual privacy practices presume the active participa-
tion of individuals in the process of setting the privacy.
This dimension, on the one hand, allows for tracing the
media discourse in Poland in termsof privacy as a bottom-
up perspective when it is actively implemented in the ev-
eryday media practices of users (Kubitschko, 2018). As
the studies prove, Polish users’ privacy practices are fol-
lowing the idea of “acting on media” in terms of surveil-
lance (Möller & Nowak, 2018b). On the other hand, par-
ticipatory dimension considers also the advocacy of or-
ganisations that participate actively in promoting pri-
vacy (Bennett, 2008). The search for a manifestation of
the participatory dimension in the privacy discourse in
Poland can be linked to the activity of privacy advocacy
organizations as Panoptykon (a countersurveillance and
privacy advocacy NGO) or Zaufana Trzecia Strona (data
security and privacy advocacy collective). Thus, traces of
the participatory dimension in the discourse will indicate
not just the specific privacy practices but also the politics
of privacy that such institutions propose.
The last dimension is a technological one. The
privacy-oriented practices of individuals and groups
strongly rely on communication technologies and data
protection. Digital technology and social media compa-
nies that offer the unlimited space for interactions are
the most powerful data-harvesters. At the same time,
users’ access to their personal data is efficiently limited.
Eventually, a communication market evolves towards
an imbalanced struggle between centralized privately-
controlled data flows and decentralization, i.e., giving it
back to users (Möller & von Rimscha, 2017). Thus, to
some extent, the technological dimension of privacy can
be understood as a common discursive thread that can
run through the other dimensions.
Such theoretical framework allows us to state the
main research question: What is the character of media
discourse on privacy in Poland? To answer it, we state
two subordinate research questions: a) Which institu-
tional agents construct the media discourse; and b) how
privacy is framed in the media discourse? Firstly, we con-
ceptualise the character of the institutional discourse on
privacy in terms of the five aforementioned dimensions.
However, the character of the media discourse may also
reflect some other specific features that are illustrative
for Polish discourse in general. Thus, besides of the di-
mensionswe search for specific issues concerningmedia-
orientation, publisher’s political position and attitude to-
wards the economy or possible discursive polarisation.
Secondly, we search for institutional actors that form
the media discourse on privacy. Thus, we analyse how
certain dimensions are approached by social institutions
and their representatives, including politicians, officials,
journalists, experts, or ordinary people. Thirdly, we look
at how the discursive relationship between institutions
and dimensions is framed in linguistic categories.
3. Research Design and Methodology
To answer the research questions, we apply a critical dis-
course studies (CDS) approach that follows the method-
ological framework recommended by Unger et al. (2016,
pp. 1191–1197). A crucial fact to note is that the ap-
plied CDS approach is inductive but it requires state-
of-art analysis concerning existing theoretical knowl-
edge on the particular case. Thus, the analytical pro-
cedure started with the theoretical notions on dis-
courses of privacy and resulted in shaping the theoreti-
cal model and particular privacy-related discursive cate-
gories (see Figure 1).
Then, we executed a CDS approach in a three-stage
data-based inductive analysis (Unger et al., 2016). Firstly,
to have a general outlook on the shape of the discourse,
we undertook desk research of privacy-oriented publi-
cations from two privacy-activist media websites and
one privacy-advocacy NGO website. This totalled 133
privacy-oriented cases from January 2018 to September
2019. It allowed us to extract a list of issues related
to privacy in the Polish media discourse in that partic-
ular time. As desk research indicated, Polish media dis-
course was dominated by certain events rather than by
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Figure 1. Analytical framework.
general privacy-related ongoing debates. This timetable
was selected because of two case-related purposes. The
first was the initiation of the GDPR debate in Poland.
However, to capture its development, we started to col-
lect the data from January 2018, a few months before
the GDPR peaked. The second issue concerns the final
case of FaceApp that saturated the discourse on privacy
in September 2019.
Secondly, based on this we defined 12 issue-oriented
categories. These are described in Table 1.
Thirdly, we conducted a quantitative and qualitative
content analysis of media publications covering the 12
selected categories from January 2018 to September
2019. CDS approaches to text analysis and sampling are
directed by the research questions (Bennett, 2018; cf.
Unger et al., 2016). Thus, in order to capture the gen-
eral character of the discourse on privacy, especially its
dimensions, agents and frames, we used the purposive
sampling. As the result, we collected a full sample com-
posed of 169 texts from the websites of two newspapers
(Gazeta Wyborcza [GW] and Fakt), two weekly political
magazines (Polityka and Wprost), and two online news
portals (wp.pl andwPolityce.pl). Media outlets were cho-
sen according to the highest readership and popularity
rates, and differences in editorial slant, both political
and economic. Then, we used content analysis to extract
the specific codes and linguistic categories of the texts
(see Supplementary File) to reflect the five concepts of
privacy: Relational, participatory, contextual, technolog-
ical, and normative. Since the dynamic nature of dis-
course, these concepts are often collocated in particu-
lar texts. To complement the discursive construction of
privacy dimensionswith the institutional component, we
distinguished five concepts related to institutional actors
that shape the media discourse: Officials, politicians, ex-
perts, journalists, and the regular man. These concepts
and their intersections are analysed in Section 4. What
is important in terms of CDS framework, is that partic-
ular text excerpts are analysed to capture certain ways
of argumentation and narrative frames (cf. Jäger, 2002;
Wodak, 2002).
4. Research Results
4.1. The Character of Polish Privacy Discourse and
Its Dimensions
Both quantitative and qualitative analysis indicates four
main issues in terms of the character of Polish media dis-
course on privacy. The first one concerns the manifes-
tations of privacy dimensions. Due to the historical ex-
perience of Poland and the invasive politics of the gov-
ernment, as well as the interest in privacy protection
declared by citizens, we expected that the Polish dis-
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Table 1. Issue-oriented categories.
Category Description
GDPR In Polish abbreviated as RODO
Uber Lex A plan of changes in the Road Transport Act where the main issue concerned
every driver who provides services related to the transport of persons must
meet specific criteria, including usage of a mobile application that collects
passengers data
Police Directive A case related to the implementation of EU regulations, and related to the
protection of personal data as part of actions taken to fight and prevent crime
Failure of government IT systems I.e., epuap.gov.pl (an e-administration platform)
Central list of banned domains A government initiative to create a register of banned domains (ultimately the
project was not implemented due to non-compliance with EU law)
National Cyberarmy The establishment of a Polish cyber military unit
Morele.net The leakage of users’ personal data
Government Center for Security Fake text messages signed by Government Centre for Security announcing
widespread mobilization
The Ministry of Digital Affairs and The Ministry of Digital Affairs and Facebook have signed an agreement on
Facebook agreement blocking accounts containing undesirable content
Facebook data leakage Data breach of 50 million accounts on Facebook in September 2018
The termination of Google’s contract Due to the US legal concerns over Huawei equipment, Google terminates the
with Huawei Android support license on the Huawei smartphones
FaceApp The introduction of the FaceApp mobile application
course would have a participatory and relational, that
is, citizen-oriented dimensions. Meanwhile, the most ex-
plicit in the Polish media discourse was the contextual
(58.3%), technological (49.4%), and normative (48.8%)
dimension of privacy. A relatively equal distribution of
these dimensions in the sample resulted in a lower rep-
resentation of the relational dimension (36.3%) and the
participatory one (12.5%). The results indicate that the
normative dimension was mainly based on EU privacy
policy proceedings that form a top-down legal norm
rather than a citizen/user-oriented data privacy ‘man-
ual.’ Crucially, normative and participatory dimensions
are only co-present in 10 (from 169) articles.
Secondly, data show that the Polish media discourse
on privacy is strongly oriented to the legal and formal
aspects of privacy. Thus, it addresses the application
of EU-level privacy policy in Poland and general legal
proceedings. The distribution of particular topics in the
examined period indicates that the theme most often
discussed in the context of privacy was GDPR (46.5%),
followed by Facebook users’ data leakage (7.6%), Lex
Uber (7%), and the termination of Google’s agreement
with Huawei (7%) (see Figure 2). Importantly, the subject
of GDPR was the most popular issue in the entire anal-
ysed period. Surely, the introduction of the GDPR invigo-
rated the debate on privacy in Poland, yet it also strength-
ened the formal and legal nature of the discourse lim-
iting the same time more user-oriented bottom-up ap-
proaches to privacy and data protection.
Thirdly, the media discourse on privacy was not po-
larized as one would expect concerting media divisions.
The issue of privacy is mainly discussed in the dailies
(GW—22.5%, the tabloid Fakt—21.3%) and online news
portals (wpolityce.pl—23.7%, wp.pl—15.4%). Thus, as
a consequence, the issues of complex privacy-related
legal changes were communicated as news (65.7%).
Meanwhile, columns that allow for a more descriptive
and analytical form were much less used (21.3%). One
would expect that the media discourse in which the
participatory dimension of privacy is emphasized re-
quires a more opinionated contribution. This finding is
likely to have been an effect of publication frequency,
with weeklies having the lowest ratio (Polityka—8.9%,
Wprost—8.3%). Moreover, the relational, participatory
and technological dimensions of privacy were observed
more frequently in liberal outlets, like GW. It is worth
to add that GW, Polityka, and wp.pl present liberal slant
both in terms of politics and the economy. Therefore,
we expected that through their texts they would call for
the protection of the privacy of the individual. On the
other hand, the normative and contextual dimensions
were more frequent in conservative outlets. Tabloid Fakt,
wPolityce.pl and, to a lesser extent, Wprost promote a
conservative worldview and statism in the approach to
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 302–313 306
FaceApp
Publicaon Topic
Google and Huawei
Facebook Data Leakage
Blocking of Facebook Accounts
Gov. Center for Security
Morele.net
Naonal Cyberarmy
Central List of Banned Domains
Failure of Gov. IT Systems
GDPR
Police Direcve
Uber Lex
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Jan
–M
ar
 20
18
Ap
r–
Ju
n 2
01
8
Ju
l–S
ep
t 2
01
8
Oc
t–
De
c 2
01
8
Jan
–M
ar
 20
19
Ap
r–
Ju
n 2
01
9
Ju
l–S
ep
t 2
01
9
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 to
pi
cs
Date
Figure 2. Frequency of privacy topics from January 2018 to September 2019.
the economy. Therefore, we expected the texts that indi-
cate the important role of the state and its institutions in
shaping the privacy policy. The results, however, indicate
that the differences in addressing particular privacy di-
mensions are not significant in relation with political and
economic slants of the medium. For instance, the partic-
ipatory dimension was observed in 7.7% texts in liberal
media to 4.8% in conservative (in terms of politics) and re-
spectively 8.3% to 4.2% (in termsof economy). Normative
dimension was observed in 21.4% of texts in liberal me-
dia to 27.4% in conservative (in terms of politics) and re-
spectively 26.2% to 22.6% (in terms of economy). Thus,
as in the case of political discourse in general, the privacy
issues depend on editorial policies, although we are not
able to conclude on media-related polarization.
Finally, privacy discourse was monopolised by news
and informational function of the language used (ob-
served in 89.3% of articles). However, a solid part of
the texts was filled with expressive functions (in 37.5%)
and persuasive (in 26.8%). Considering the saturation
by metaphors (observed in 71.2% of the articles) and
hyperboles (in 57.7%), the character of discourse on
privacy may resemble the nature of political discourse
in general in terms of its emotionality (cf. Balczyńska-
Kosman, 2013).
4.2. Institutional Agents that Shape Privacy in Discourse
Concerning the institutional agents that shape the Polish
media discourse on privacy, it follows two main pat-
terns. The first is institutional dispersal. Among the
many agents that contribute to the discourse on pri-
vacy, government or public agencies and offices were
presented by the Research and Academic Computer
Network, CERT Poland, theMinistry of Digital Affairs, the
Personal Data Protection Office, the Inspector General
for the Protection of Personal Data, the Ministry of
Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Administration. The expert side was presented inter
alia by independent digital security experts, data se-
curity experts, Facebook, Niebezpiecznik (a data secu-
rity and privacy advocacy collective and news website),
Panoptykon (a countersurveillance and privacy advocacy
NGO), lawyers and law firms (i.e., PwC consultancy firm),
and Uber. Therefore, various institutions propose a dif-
ferent policy shaping the discourse on privacy in Poland.
Journalists and experts contributed the most to the dis-
course in the period we examined (98.8% and 41.2%).
Officials were framed less often, only in 26.1% of mate-
rials. The frequency of politicians’ statements was only
9.7%. That observations are significant in the context of
today state’s privacy-invasive privacy politics. On the one
hand, lack of commitment in the way of creating the dis-
course about privacy can be a deliberate action of state
institutions that distract the public opinion from the cru-
cial privacy issues. On the other hand, the low presence
of politicians may indicate that the issue of privacy is not
perceived as a part of a significant political struggle but
rather as a specific policy that is the consequence of le-
gal regulations.
Secondly, the intersection of institutional agents and
privacy dimensions indicates that politicians, officials,
and experts mostly addressed the contextual, technolog-
ical and normative dimensions of privacy, leaving a par-
ticipatory on the lowest level (see Table 2). Yet, the con-
textual dimension triggered by political actors does not
refer to the specific political affairs but rather to the leg-
islative context of applying EU law in Poland. The par-
ticipatory dimension is most common among journalists
(12.8%), slightly less among experts (7.3%). However, it
mostly reflects legal arrangements and, besides a few ex-
cerpts, does not enhance the user participation in terms,
for instance, data protection. Officials (3.7%) and politi-
cians (0.6%) almost bypassed participatory issues, hence,
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Table 2. Relation between institutions and dimensions of privacy (%).
Dimension Total
texts sumRelational Participatory Technological Normative Contextual
Institution Official n 15 6 18 19 27 43
% total 9.1% 3.7% 11.0% 11.6% 16.5% 26.2%
Politician n 3 1 10 10 10 16
% total 1.8% 0.6% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 9.8%
Expert n 31 12 37 36 39 68
% total 18.9% 7.3% 22.6% 22.0% 23.8% 41.5%
Journalist n 58 21 82 80 95 162
% total 35.4% 12.8% 50.0% 48.8% 57.9% 98.8%
Regular man n 2 2 3 3 8 10
% total 1.2% 1.2% 1.8% 1.8% 4.9% 6.1%
Total N 60 21 81 81 97 164
% total 36.6% 12.8% 49.4% 49.4% 59.1% 100.0%
it confirms the previous traces about distracting the pub-
lic opinion or not considering privacy as political. At the
same time, it indicates that the participatory dimension
of privacy may not an element of the state’s public com-
munication in general. The normative dimension, like-
wise to the contextual, was framed mostly by journal-
ists (48.8%), experts (22%), and officials (11.6%) leaving
politicians with 6.1%. The institutional framing of a norm
on privacy refers to a top-down perspective where the
state’s (for instance in GDPR case) and corporate policies
(for instance Facebook or Google cases) communicate
what citizens are committed to doing in regard to privacy.
Norms are, thus, reduced to being legal rules without
alternative for citizens who are rather believed to obey
what is imposed upon them.
4.3. Discursive Narrative Frames of Privacy Policy
This correlation between institutions and dimensions
was analysed in terms of narrative frames that particular
agents used shaping the discourse. The analysis indicates
three main discursive narratives concerning framing pri-
vacy policy by institutional actors. Firstly, as previously
demonstrated, the media discourse was mostly framed
with the formal narrative based on legal procedures by-
passing political aspects of privacy. For instance, texts
that focus mostly on the normative dimension are dom-
inated by frames of “regulations,” “proceedings,” “le-
gal frameworks,” and “data processing,” often using for-
mal language and informational style captured in formal
legal-based discursive manner:
Later in the autumn of 2017, the assumptions to the
amendment to the Act on the provision of electronic
services have been prepared, pursuant to which
Facebook could no longer make arbitrary decisions
on blocking accounts. (Czubkowska, 2018)
Personal Data Protection Office…has to check
whetherGDPR regulationswill be respected. Penalties
can be severe because companies are threatenedwith
fines of up to 20 million euros. (Kowanda, 2018)
Today, the police and the prosecutor’s office process
our data on the principles set out in the Personal
Data Protection Act of 1997, and their operation is
subject to the control of the Inspector General for the
Protection of Personal Data. (Ivanova, 2018)
Other legal topics—for instance, Uber Lex, the estab-
lishment of a Polish National Cyberarmy, and the gov-
ernment agreement with Facebook—were mostly news
pieces with short excerpts of official statements of
the ministries framed in an informative manner to ex-
press involvement of particular institutions, for example:
“As there is no legal path of appeal against the decision of
social network platforms registered outside Poland, we
decided to approach the problem from the administra-
tive angle” (Bednarek, 2018).
Since analysis indicate that privacy-related issues are
framed not as a field of political struggle and debate but
rather as a policy to be implemented as a consequence of
legal regulations, there were limited excepts where the
politicians contributed to the discourse, for instance, in
case of the GDPR:
We collected over three thousand signatures, al-
though a thousand fewer was enough. But two weeks
of collecting signatures on the streets and in the mar-
kets made me realize that in the era of the GDPR,
people do not want to provide their data to a per-
son whom they do not know, and to sign the pe-
tition supporting the political committee, you need
to provide your name, surname, address and PESEL.
(Kursa, 2019)
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Here and in the other articles on the GDPR, politicians
perceive the new regulations as an obstacle to electoral
campaigning that they try to find an administrative so-
lution for. For example, GDPR is closed in a frame of
an epochal regulation: ‘the era of GDPR.’ The politician
shares his concern of the issue of private data that could
be shared ‘to a person whom they don’t know,’ hence
he poses himself as the ‘stranger,’ a person of limited
trust. In the initial phrase, the politician claims that de-
spite GDPR they ‘collected over three thousands signa-
tures, although…’ using at same time the narrative of
active involvement that refers to frame us versus them,
politicians versus common people who are not willing to
support the committee or provide the private data.
A second narrative frame refers to polarisation and
contrasting concerning relations of users and the state or
corporations. In the following excerpts, the contradiction
between users’ rights and capabilities in relation with
Facebook serves as a crucial narrative juxtaposition:
It’s really not difficult to violate community rules or
Facebook regulations. This happens every day to po-
litical activists, organizers of assemblies, social organi-
zations and ordinary users. (Szymielewicz, 2018)
The way to restore a blocked account or content
more resembles a fruit machine than an objective
tribunal. All protests of blocked users go into one
bag. Just one click is enough. Facebook gives every-
one who is unsatisfied a simple interface but denies
them the right to speak. The user has no place to
write why he thinks that his content or account has
been unjustly blocked. An activist to whom the por-
tal took the work tool, presses the same button as
the “regular user” who was cut out from part of a
social conversation. They both wait for the machine
to grind through the protest and spit out something.
The effect of the grinding is either to remove the
block (without a word of explanation) or the decision
to maintain it (also without a word of explanation).
(Szymielewicz, 2018)
On the one hand, a tech company is framed with
metaphors of ‘fruit machine,’ ‘waiting for the machine
to grind’ or the ‘private censorship’ that is used in the ti-
tle of the article to describe the social media platform’s
arcane decision-making process. On the other hand, a
frame used to capture users’ weaker position in rela-
tion to tech companies is deployed: ‘protests of blocked
users go to one bag’ metaphor, ‘regular users’ neologism
or ‘violation of community rules or Facebook is really
not difficult. Every day it happens to political activists,
assembly organizers, social organizations and ordinary
users’ later in the same article. Thus, in this case, norma-
tive and participatory dimensions intersected with the
institutional actors justify the bottom-up perspective in
privacy-oriented norm by ascribing negative attributions
through metaphors to tech companies.
However, 7 of the 10 articles that intersect norma-
tive and participatory dimensions address issues of the
GDPR using a narrative of trivialising by referring to the
absurdity of its implementation: “Hospitals and clinics
have been made stupid by the GDPR” (Watoła, 2018),
“GDPR at school. Student number five, acknowledge re-
ceipt of the test” (Warchała, 2018), or “Besides, most of
what the media call the absurdities of the GDPR results
from incomplete knowledge of the rules by administra-
tors and an excessive zeal often caused by fear of high
penalties” (“Absurdy RODO,” 2018). In general, the sam-
ple frequently zooms in onto the frame of “banality” of
the GDPR. The norm is again framed around the notion
of legal relation between particular institutions and citi-
zens that need to follow the rule that is “banal.” Thus, the
narrative of trivialising labelled with the frame of “banal”
regulation, undermines the participatory and relational
dimensions by reinforcing top-down privacy order and in-
equality between tech company and users.
Thirdly, there were only a few cases where the nar-
rative frame enhanced the privacy of citizens/users and
put forward a bottom-up privacy policy. In such cases,
the narrative frame of intensification was deployed in ad-
dressing the normative dimension and to some extent
participatory one. For instance, a solely participatory di-
mension of privacy was referred to in the articles on
data leakages, i.e., from Facebook and the online shop
Morele.net:
What should you do if you are on the list (of leaked
Morele.net data—Authors)? If your email addresswas
on the displayed list, change your password immedi-
ately. It is also a good idea to use the already popu-
lar two-step authorization option. In most cases this
should help. If your email has a good spam filter, there
is a chance that you will never realize that your ad-
dress has been stolen. (“Ze sklepu morele.net,” 2019)
Such a ‘privacy tutorial’ based on a do it yourself inten-
sification narrative frame was characteristic for pieces
on building data-privacy awareness in the discourse in
a bottom-up manner. Privacy policies were directly ad-
dressed to the users (“you,” “your”) and aimed at ei-
ther protection of their data or to raise awareness
of technological issues concerning privacy, as in the
Google/Huawei case. It was framed with direct indica-
tions to intensify privacy practices: “change your pass-
word immediately,” “good idea to use,” “should help.”
The evidence, however, indicates that only a few ex-
cerpts in the entire sample offer a user-oriented ap-
proach to privacy policies.
Similarly, the case of FaceApp follows such a narra-
tive frame. The worldwide popularity of FaceApp also ef-
fected the Polish discourse on privacy. Importantly, it ad-
dressed the privacy issue not just as a legal, EU-related
process, but as a user-oriented “tutorial” of data pro-
tection that forms privacy policy of sorts. In the sample,
this issue was constructed as predominantly being tack-
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led by officials, experts and journalists. Discursively, the
FaceApp case was framed in multiple narrative schemes.
From informative lines describing basic functions of the
app, through to the frame of “danger” and “threat,”
as in tabloid daily Fakt: “FaceApp, the record-breaking
Russian mobile app for Apple iOS devices threatens
users’ privacy, inter alia by sending their photos directly
to the cloud servers of the app creators who make
them available to the external entities” (“Popularna
aplikacja,’’ 2019).
There were also some contextual opinions, refer-
ring to previous privacy threats and data-security ana-
lysis and detailed case studies of users’ privacy on-
line practices:
The Poles checked whether the application is se-
cure….CERT Poland experts examined the conduct
of the FaceApp application, which aroused both
huge interest and considerable controversy last week.
Experts have analysed this software to see if it actually
allows for “stealing” data. (Breczko, 2019)
Finally, it was critically framed in the discourse from
a normative perspective by Katarzyna Szymielewicz
(Panoptykon president):
We feed data algorithms without reflection, without
knowing and being able to predict for what purpose
their ability to recognize our biometric features and
behaviour modelling—from how we move, what and
whenwe buy—will be used by commercial companies
and states that use their knowledge. If you react with
slight anxiety to the line “Russian application,” I en-
courage you to remain sceptical about any applica-
tions that give you something trivial in exchange for
valuable data. (Szymielewicz, 2019)
Importantly, with limited knowledge about the actual
operations of FaceApp, the initial narrative frame used
by state officials was convergent with the “danger” and
“threat” scheme connected directly to Russian disinfor-
mation strategies, thus “Russian” and its collocation
serves in the discourse as a negative label used to dep-
recation but also as a form of argumentation strategy
aimed in justification of negative attribution ascribed
to Russia (cf. Lokot, 2020). Yet, over time the narrative
frame of perspectivation was deployed with references
to experts and their research on the actual function of
the application. It shifted the discourse into the more
data-based perspective in building a specific norm of pri-
vacy captured in frames of, for instance: “CERT Poland ex-
perts,” “experts have analysed” (Breczko, 2019). Finally,
the expert’s analysis triggered the normative dimension
to frame the norm. On the one hand, the excerpt starts
with the frame that justify the imbalance between the
users who “feed data algorithms without reflection” and
the tech companies referring to users’ incompetence
and emotions: “without reflection” or “without know-
ing” and “slight anxiety” (Szymielewicz, 2019). On the
other hand, the narrative frame deploys the intensifica-
tion of a norm coined in user-oriented call to “encour-
agement” or being “sceptical.” As analysis indicates, the
normative frame referred to a crucial data privacy and
surveillance issues. However, this frame was triggered
the most not by the user-oriented concerns but rather
as the issue imposed from a top-down perspective as in
the FaceApp case.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Privacy is articulated both in terms of policy and politics.
Concerning the general character of Polish media dis-
course, contemporary politics and the historical settings,
we would have expected polarized debate with strong
references to the communist past. Instead, it seems that
Polish debates on privacy are driven by contemporary
European politics. Indeed, some data prove the rise of
the awareness and good practices in the field of privacy
protection in last decade, but the same time 59% of re-
spondents in Poland have not heard of privacy-invasive
practices, i.e., data collection, of state or government
entities (European Commission, 2015). Despite the fact
that Poles declare that the protection of privacy is a very
important issue, the research conducted after the im-
plementation of the GDPR shows that 40% of respon-
dents have not heard about the GDPR at all (“Polacy, bez
szerszej wiedzy o RODO,” 2018). Therefore, when taking
up the problem of the specifics of the discourse on pri-
vacy in Poland,wewere interested in assessing its nature,
i.e., whether it is focused on increasing citizens’ aware-
ness and knowledge and giving a kind of know-howwhen
it comes to privacy practices.
Three crucial issues characterise the Polishmedia dis-
course on privacy. Firstly, participatory and relational as-
pects of privacy are hardly present. It may seem sur-
prising given the communist mass surveillance past and
surveillance current state’s politics. Thus, concerning pri-
vacy dimensions, the relation between citizen and the
state is norm-based, the norm is almost entirely legal,
and the citizens’ participation is purely data-oriented
and limited. In terms of the topic referential frame, the
results of our research have shown that the discourse
on privacy is dominated by the legal aspects. Moreover,
the topic of privacy was primarily related to the EU pri-
vacy policy and the GDPR is the most common topic
in the narrative throughout the entire analysed period.
The emerging privacy discussion in Poland was triggered
by external factors and not by internal debates on the
importance of privacy in political contexts. As a conse-
quence, the media discourse was primarily informative,
focused on mainly framing legal aspects of privacy poli-
cies, which is related to the specificity of the procedural
issue concerning, e.g., GDPR, Lex Uber, the Cyberarmy,
and Facebook regulations.
Secondly, our research shows the variety of insti-
tutional agents that shape privacy media discourse.
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 302–313 310
Apart from journalists, who naturally participate in me-
dia debates, the experts and their institutions framed
the privacy policy debate (including independent digi-
tal security and data security experts, Facebook officials,
Niebezpiecznik workers, Panoptykon, PwC, Uber, Bolt,
etc.). Representatives of the state institutions and politi-
cians were much less frequently present in the sample,
despite the fact that the discourse was tilted towards
the legal framework of privacy policies. It may indicate
that privacy is not perceived as political or state’s repre-
sentatives may also not be interested in firming privacy-
conscious public opinion. Thus, the thematic frame con-
firms that multiple official institutions dealing with pri-
vacy regulations, often do not mention ‘privacy’ at all.
The study shows limited evidence that privacy policies
present in the media discourse form a norm regarding
how to deal with privacy and data protection when it
comes to the actual online environment. Moreover, this
is led by experts rather than official institutions. If any pri-
vacy norm is pursued, it is rather not citizen-oriented but
captures the legal relations of state and public/private in-
stitutions or public/private institutions with the citizen.
Instead of discussions on how to enhance privacy within
such a dynamic information environment, as is the case
in Germany (cf. von Pape et al., 2017), the Polish media
discourse mainly reflected the formal aspect bypassing
the context of state’s privacy-invasive privacy politics.
Thirdly, the intersection of privacy dimensions and
institutional agents that form discourse on privacy was
particularly important to our study. Thus, we have analy-
sed particular excerpts to see what narrative frames and
with what linguistic tools were deployed. The critical dis-
course analysis confirms the domination of formal nar-
rative frame focused on legal-based proceedings. Its for-
mality is shaped with an informational report that rein-
forces the top-down approach to privacy or is accompa-
nied by trivializing narrative using ‘banal’ frame to cap-
ture the legal regulations. Moreover, the juxtaposition
narrative slants the frame of inequality between posi-
tively labelled users and tech companies labelled nega-
tively. It follows an argumentation strategy used to jus-
tify the labels of users’ exclusion and their unequal po-
sition in the discourse. It, to some extent, resembles
the polarisation tendencies of Polish political discourse
in general (cf. Balczyńska-Kosman, 2013). However, in
building the normative take to privacy, institutional ac-
tors (experts) deploy the intensification frame in a more
user-oriented manner to mitigate a more bottom-up pri-
vacy policy. Yet, these attempts were limited. Instead
of targeting the issues of privacy as essential to Polish
historical and current political drive, experts and politi-
cians refer to privacy as something “imposed on us” from
the outside, whether this is EU regulation or tech com-
pany affairs.
Concerning the historical development of privacy in a
post-communist country, the media discourse indicates
that privacy still resembles the omnipotent control of the
state (or the corporation) that tells citizens “what to do”
in terms of the entering the legal proceedings. Yet with-
out improving citizens’ privacy when it comes to relation
with the state or corporation. Concerning the contem-
porary privacy-invasive politics of the state, the analysis
illustrates that privacy is perceived as externally imple-
mented and do not relate to political issues. Thus, privacy
policy framed in the discourse does not normalise the re-
lation between the state and the citizen. Apart from the
Facebook and government agreement this rarely refers
to any specific normon privacy policy in the participatory
dimension. As a result, the privacy policy in Polish dis-
course reframes or repackages a patchwork of often un-
related narratives reflecting multiple institutions that try
to “translate” legal norms to citizens instead of enhanc-
ing them with actual awareness and data-privacy skills.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express the gratitude the
Department of Communication,Media and Journalismat
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń for the financial
support and the student assistants for their research in-
put on the initial stages of the project.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
Supplementary Material
Supplementarymaterial for this article is available online
in the format provided by the authors (unedited).
References
Absurdy RODO wynikają z nieznajomości prawa [GDPR
absurdities arise from ignorance of the law].
(2018, November 25). wPolityce. Retrieved from
https://wgospodarce.pl/informacje/56819-absurdy-
rodo-wynikaja-z-nieznajomosci-prawa
Balczyńska-Kosman, A. (2013). Język dyskursu pub-
licznego w polskim systemie politycznym [Language
of public discourse in the Polish political system].
Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, 2013(2),
143–153.
Bednarek, A. (2018, November 28). Zbanowali cię na
Facebooku? Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji pomoże. Jako
pierwsze na świecie [They banned you on Facebook?
The Ministry of Digital Affairs will help. As the first in
the world]. WP. Retrieved from https://tech.wp.pl/
zbanowali-cie-na-facebooku-ministerstwo-
cyfryzacji-pomoze-jako-pierwsze-na-swiecie-
6321823758816897a
Bennett, C. J. (2008). The privacy advocates: Resisting the
spread of surveillance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bennett, S. (2018). Constructions of migrant integration
in British public discourse: Becoming British. London:
Bloomsbury Academics.
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 302–313 311
Breczko, B. (2019, July 23). FaceApp. Polacy sprawdzili,
czy aplikacja jest bezpieczna [FaceApp. The Poles
checked whether the application is secure]. WP. Re-
trieved from https://tech.wp.pl/faceapp-polacy-
sprawdzili-czy-aplikacja-jest-bezpieczna-
6405620686218881a
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2016). Inwigilacja
w internecie [Surveillance on the Internet] (Report
No. 72/2016). Warszawa: Fundacja Centrum Badania
Opinii Społecznej.
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2018). Bez-
pieczeństwo w internecie [Security on the Internet]
(Report No. 133/2018). Warszawa: Fundacja Cen-
trum Badania Opinii Społecznej.
Czubkowska, S. (2018, November 28). Zablokował cię
Facebook? Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji pomoże. Serwis
Zucerberga ugina się pod naciskiem rządów [Face-
book blocked you? The Ministry of Digital Affairs will
help. Zuckerberg’s website is bending under govern-
ment pressure]. Gazeta Wyborcza. Retrieved from
https://wyborcza.pl/7,156282,24218971,facebook-
ugina-sie-pod-rzadami-takze-polskim.html
Czyżewski, M., Kowalski, S., & Piotrowski, A. (2010). Ry-
tualny chaos: Studium dyskursu publicznego [Ritual
chaos: A study of public discourse]. Warszawa: WAiP.
European Commission. (2015). Special Eurobarom-
eter 431: Data protection. Brussels: European
Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/
commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/
ebs_431_en.pdf
Gorwa, R. (2017). Computational propaganda in
Poland: False amplifiers and the digital public
sphere (Working Paper No.2017.4). Oxford: Oxford
University. Retrieved from https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.
uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/
06/Comprop-Poland.pdf
Ivanova, E. (2018, February 27). Dyrektywa policyjna
musi być wdrożona do 6 maja. Jeśli Polska nie zdąży,
nie będzie kontroli nad zbieraniem danych obywateli
[The police directive must be implemented by
May 6. If Poland fails on time, there will be no
control over the collection of citizens’ data]. Gazeta
Wyborcza. Retrieved from https://wyborcza.pl/
7,75398,23074697,dyrektywa-policyjna-musi-byc-
wdrozona-do-6-maja-jesli-polska.html
Jäger, S. (2002). Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical
and methodological aspects of a critical discourse
and dispositive analysis. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer
(Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp.
32–62). London: SAGE.
Kowanda, C. (2018, June 5). RODO na łapu-capu
[GDPR in a hurry-scurry]. Polityka. Retrieved from
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/rynek/
1750974,1,rodo-na-lapu-capu.read
Kubitschko, S. (2018). Acting on media technologies and
infrastructures: Expanding the media as practice ap-
proach. Media, Culture & Society, 40(4), 629–635.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0163443717706068
Kursa, M. (2019, September 2). Wybory parlamentarne
2019: W dobie RODO coraz trudniej o podpisy z
poparciem [2019 Parliamentary elections: In the age
of the GDPR, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
collect the signatures of support]. Gazeta Wyborcza.
Retrieved from https://krakow.wyborcza.pl/krakow/
7,44425,25149014,wybory-parlamentarne-2019-w-
dobie-rodo-coraz-trudniej-o-podpisy.html
Lokot, T. (2020). Data subjects vs. people’s data: Compet-
ing discourses of privacy and power inmodern Russia.
Media and Communication, 8(2), 314–322.
Meissner, F., & von Nordheim, G. (2018). Exploration
of a fragmented discourse. Privacy and data secu-
rity in Süddeutsche Zeitung: 2007–2017. Mediati-
zation Studies, 2018(2), 103–123. https://doi.org/
10.17951/ms.2018.2.103-123
Möller, J., & Nowak, J. (2018a). Surveillance and pri-
vacy as emerging issues in communication and me-
dia studies. An introduction. Mediatization Studies,
2018(2), 7–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/ms.2018.
2.7-15
Möller, J., & Nowak, J. (2018b). Don’t hate the me-
dia: Act on media. Civil society agents’ media-
oriented practices on encryption/privacy. [Power-
Point presentation].
Möller, J., & von Rimscha, M. B. (2017).
(De)centralization of the global informational
ecosystem. Media and Communication, 5(3), 37–48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i3.1067
Nissenbaum, H. (2010). Privacy in context: Technology,
policy, and the integrity of social life. Stanford, CA:
Stanford Law Books.
Polacy, bez szerszej wiedzy o RODO—sondaż ARC
Rynek i Opinia [Poles, without broader knowledge
about the GDPR—ARC market and opinion poll].
(2018, May 8). Rzeczpospolita. Retrieved from
https://www.rp.pl/Dane-osobowe/305089958-
Polacy-bez-szerszej-wiedzy-o-RODO---sondaz-ARC-
Rynek-i-Opinia.html
Popularna aplikacja może być niebezpieczna [A pop-
ular application can be dangerous]. (2019, July
18). Fakt. Retrieved from https://www.fakt.pl/
wydarzenia/polska/popularna-aplikacja-faceapp-
zagraza-prywatnosci-uzytkownikow/6tb17ln
Ptaszek, G. (2018). Surveillance capitalism and privacy:
Knowledge and attitudes on surveillance capitalism
and online institutional privacy protection practices
among adolescents in Poland. Mediatization Stud-
ies, 2018(2), 49–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/ms.
2018.2.49-68
Sojka, A. (2013). Poland: A surveillance Eldorado?
Security, privacy, and new technologies in Polish
leading newspapers (2010–2013) (Seconomics
Discussion Papers 2013/3). Prague: Institute of
Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences. Retrieved
from https://www.soc.cas.cz/sites/default/files/
soubory/poland_-_a_surveillance_eldorado.pdf
Svenonius, O., & Björklund, F. (2018). Explaining atti-
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 302–313 312
tudes to secret surveillance in post-communist soci-
eties. East European Politics, 34(2), 123–151. https://
doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1454314
Szumańska, M., Klicki, W., Niklas, W., Szymielewicz, K., &
Walkowiak, A. (2016). Zabawki wielkiego brata, czyli
krótki przewodnik po narzędziach, które pomagają
państwu kontrolować obywateli [Big brother toys, or
a short guide to the tools that help the state control
the citizens]. Warszawa: Fundacja Panoptykon.
Szymielewicz, K. (2018, November 30). Co rząd wyne-
gocjował z Facebookiem? „Noga w drzwi” prywatnej
cenzury [What the government negotiated with
Facebook? ‘Leg in the door’ of private censorship].
Polityka. Retrieved from https://www.polityka.pl/
tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1773606,1,co-rzad-
wynegocjowal-z-facebookiem-noga-w-drzwi-
prywatnej-cenzury.read
Szymielewicz, K. (2019, July 18). „Rosyjski” FaceApp
nie jest groźniejszy od samego Facebooka [‘Russian’
FaceApp is not more dangerous than Facebook it-
self]. Polityka. Retrieved from https://www.polityka.
pl/tygodnikpolityka/ludzieistyle/1800964,1,rosyjski-
faceapp-nie-jest-grozniejszy-od-samego-
facebooka.read
Unger, J., Wodak, R., & KhosraviNik, M. (2016). Critical
discourse studies and social media. In D. Silverman
(Ed.), Qualitative research (pp. 1170–1241). London:
SAGE.
von Pape, T., Trepte, S., & Mothes, C. (2017). Pri-
vacy by disaster? Press coverage of privacy and
digital technology. European Journal of Commu-
nication, 32(3), 189–207. https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F0267323117689994
Warchała, M. (2018, June 13). RODO w szkole. Uczniu
numer pięć, pokwituj odbiór klasówki [GDPR at
school. Student number five, acknowledge receipt
of the test]. Gazeta Wyborcza. Retrieved from
https://katowice.wyborcza.pl/katowice/7,35063,
23530236,uczniu-numer-piec-pokwituj-odbior.html
Watoła, J. (2018, July 28). Szpitale i poradnie ogłupiały
przez RODO. Także na Śląsku [Hospitals and clinics
have been stupid by the GDPR. Also in Silesia].
Gazeta Wyborcza. Retrieved from https://katowice.
wyborcza.pl/katowice/7,35063,23726738,szpitale-i-
poradnie-oglupialy-przez-rodo-takze-na-slasku.html
Westin, A. F. (2015). Privacy and freedom. New York, NY:
IG Publishing.
Wodak, R. (2002). The discourse historical approach. In
R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical dis-
course analysis (pp. 63–94). London: SAGE.
Ze sklepu morele.net wyciekły dane 2,5 mln użytkown-
ików. Sprawdź, czy jesteś na liście [Data from 2.5
million users leaked from themorele.net store. Check
if you are on the list]. (2019, April 22). Wprost. Re-
trieved from https://biznes.wprost.pl/firmy-i-rynki/
10210459/ze-sklepu-morelenet-wyciekly-dane-
25-mln-uzytkownikow-sprawdz-czy-jestes-na-
liscie.html
About the Authors
Łukasz Wojtkowski (PhD) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication, Media and
Journalism at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. He’s the Author of books on mediatization of
politics and culture, peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on mediatization, digital cultures, and
technology. His research interests focus on critical theory andmediatization; privacy, surveillance, and
disinformation; and critical discourses.
Barbara Brodzińska-Mirowska (PhD) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication,
Media and Journalism at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. Her science interests are focused
on political communication, public relations, political reputation, the role of new communication tech-
nologies in political communication, and mediatization of politics. She is the Author and Co-Author of
books and articles related to party politics communication activities, professionalization of political
communication and new media.
Aleksandra Seklecka (PhD) works as Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, Media
and Journalism at Nicolaus Copernicus University. She is a Political Scientist and a Sociologist. She is
the Author of over 30 articles and several books about media manipulation, political marketing, and
reports on the relations between politics and mass media. Her interests focus on Polish media system
and ritual communication.
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 302–313 313
